UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CAMILLE GASTON,

Plaintiff.

-against-

78 CATHERINE WOMAN SHELTER,

Defendant.

24-CV-5358 (LTS)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing *pro se*, brings this action asserting violations of her rights.

Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which transferred it here. By order dated July 16, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed *in forma pauperis*, that is, without prepayment of fees.

# STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an *in forma pauperis* complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); *see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.*, 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe *pro se* pleadings liberally, *Harris v. Mills*, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they *suggest*," *Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the "special solicitude" in *pro se* cases, *id.* at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, *pro se* pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

# **BACKGROUND**

The following facts are drawn from the complaint.<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff Camille Gaston resides in Brooklyn, New York. She brings this suit against the Catherine Street Women's Shelter in Manhattan (sued as "78 Catherine Woman Shelter"). The allegations are difficult to decipher. Plaintiff states:

All my paper every other thing for 3 month for me not to go to court, plus they tell the person I am suppose to go to court with Ho is my Dr Brown. Social worker lied on me. Sent me to see Sack for no reason . . . . Recupe me to see Symth as Sack Hospital setting for mental . . . .

(ECF 1, at 4.)

In response to a question on the form complaint about the facts underlying the claim, Plaintiff writes:

Man & girl want to kill me I tell floor manager she said I am liedying (2) I get bitt up by the man on my head (3) same man push me in my shoulder coming from Hospital at 6 am give those worker hospital then by going to the store for cigarette young man poush me.

(*Id.* at 5.)

Plaintiff seeks \$1.5 million in damages. (*Id.* at 3.)

### **DISCUSSION**

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise.

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially just legal conclusions. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. *Id*.

Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to put Defendant on notice of what Defendant did or failed to do that allegedly violated her rights. Plaintiff's claims must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

### LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. *See Hill v. Curcione*, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); *Salahuddin v. Cuomo*, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts "should not dismiss [a *pro se* complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." *Cuoco v. Moritsugu*, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting *Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank*, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because it is unclear whether Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to amend her complaint to detail her claims.

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.

# **CONCLUSION**

Plaintiff's complaint, filed *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days' leave to replead.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *See Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2025

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge